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A CALL TO ACTION: SAVING AMERICA'S COMMERCIAL
FISHERMEN
MICHAEL C. LAURENCE*
A former salmon fisher has fallen back on sewing nets, hoping that
government disaster relief will provide her with money for education. She
lost her boat, her house, and the fishing business she had hoped her son
could continue.
I. INTRODUCTION
As depicted in the paintings of Winslow Homer, and much like the
American farmer, commercial fishermen represent a way of life revered in
American culture. Unfortunately, the fisherman also shares with the
farmer a common plight.2 Rooted in a mutual reliance on Nature's
dwindling resources and similarly plagued by intense government
regulation of those resources, both the farmer and the fisherman face a
continued struggle for survival and for financial viability within their
respective ways of life.3
It has been generally recognized for some time that there are too
many fishing boats harvesting too many fish from dangerously depleted
stocks. There has been little disagreement amongst the various interest
groups as to the need for better conservation,5 but as to degree and the
specific remedy, there continues to be ample debate. Environmentalists,
government regulators, politicians, consumers, impacted local
communities, recreational anglers, seafood processors, and of course,
* Michael Laurence received his B.A. from the College of William and Mary in 1995 and
expects to receive his J.D. from William and Mary School of Law in May, 2002. Prior to
law school, Mr. Laurence was a member of former Virginia Senator Charles S. Robb's
legislative staff, working extensively on issues affecting Virginia's commercial
fishermen.
I SUZANNE IUDICELLO ET AL., FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF
OVERFISHING 1 (1999).
2 See generally id.
3 See id. at 27.
4 See id. at 8-10.
5 See Jeffrey P. Cohn, Fish Story, GOV'T EXEC., Apr. 1, 2000, at 35. "That marine
resources need conservation few would argue." Id.
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commercial fishermen and their families all maintain valid and intensely
personal opinions as to the exact balance that needs to be established.
Unfortunately, given the varied interests in conflict, efforts at resolution
have been largely unsuccessful.
Specifically, it is in light of this overfishing and the need for
increased conservation that the Sustainable Fisheries Act ("SFA") 6 was
passed in 1996 as an amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens Act,7 the 1976
law primarily charged with management of American coastal and ocean
resources. As will be discussed, the SFA has failed not only to adequately
address the problems it was implemented to resolve,8 but has also
contributed confusion to the dispute9 by adding implementation standards
that demand conservation efforts both protecting the resource and
mitigating the economic effect of regulations on impacted fishing
communities.' 0 It is easy to envision how these two principles might be at
odds.
The Magnuson Act is again before Congress in need of
reauthorization, and the question as to what the government will try next
looms large. Pro-conservation forces have already levied extensive
criticism against the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), the
Commerce Department agency charged with regulation of the country's
fisheries and with SFA enforcement. 12 There is certainly the likelihood
that this law, already disposed to favor conservation efforts, may actually
be amended to better such environmental protections. 13 Few can find fault
with the need, but one question must not be forgotten amidst the rhetoric
of an improved ocean environment-a question that lies at the heart of this
Note-What about the fishermen?
This Note assesses the current status of fisheries regulation and the
inherent difficulties confronting commercial fishermen as they attempt to
6 Pub. L. No. 104-297 (1996).
7 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976).
8 Study Says Mismanagement of Nation's Fisheries Costing Taxpayers Millions; Rep.
Gilchrest Introduces New Fisheries Bill, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 9, 2000 [hereinafter Study
Says Mismanagement of Nation's Fisheries].
9See id. "The vast majority of America's fishermen are trying to fish responsibly, but
they are receiving mixed signals from fishery managers." Id.
10 See Sustainable Fisheries Act § 106(b).
11 146 CONG. REc. S6142 (daily ed. June 29, 2000) (statement of Senator Olympia
Snowe, R-Me.), available at http://www.legislative.noaa.gov/magstevenssenintro.htm.
12 See Study Says Mismanagement of Nation's Fisheries, supra note 8.
13 Cat Lazaroff, New Law Could Save Millions Spent on Fisheries Mismanagement, ENV.
NEWS SERV., Mar. 10, 2000, at 2.
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conform to a regulatory regime heavily favoring conservation. Section II
lays the groundwork, establishing the necessary vocabulary to proceed
with such a discussion and detailing the background regarding the industry
and extent of overfishing. Section III focuses on the SFA, its flawed
implementation by NMFS, and its inconsistent interpretation by the courts.
Commanding significant attention will be the national standards
established by the Act and how they should have been interpreted by
NMFS in accounting for economic impacts in regulations of the fishing
industry. Finally, Section IV concludes by evaluating a few of the popular
but imperfect remedies relied on to date and by arguing for an alternative
approach-a Congressionally funded buyout-that hopefully strikes the
right balance between environmental protection and an industry's
continued existence.
In the end it will have been readily demonstrated that the U.S.
government-the Congress, NMFS, and the courts-have failed the
commercial fisherman, that current policy is logically at odds with itself,
and that while throwing money at a problem is not always the solution, in
this matter, increased funding for scientific research, for economic
analysis, and for exit subsidies represents the last, best chance to achieve
an acceptable industry composition while saving our vital ocean resources.
As Senator John Kerry from Massachusetts stated in 1995 when the
fisheries issue took center stage with the consideration of the SFA:
The fisheries of the United States are at a crossroads and
significant action is required to remedy our fisheries
management problems and preserve the way of life of our
fishing communities. Fish on the dinner table is something
that many Americans may have taken for granted in the
past; but unless we take steps to ensure that these vital
resources are conserved, they will not be there for future
generations. 14
II. BACKGROUND
There is little doubt that United States, as well as world fish stocks,
are declining. 5 A NMFS report to Congress in October 1999, identified
14 141 CONG. REC. S247-48 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Sen. John Kerry, D-
Mass.).
15 NOAA, Fisheries Budget Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife,
and Oceans of the House Comm. on Res., 106th Cong. (Mar. 28, 2000) [hereinafter
Subcomm. on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans] (testimony of Dr. D. James
20021
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98 species as being overfished, with 127 species not being overfished. 16
In other words, "11 percent of U.S. living marine resources are overfished
or are approaching overfished, [while] 14 percent are not overfished..,17
Even more troubling is the notion that the status of 75 percent of our
fisheries, or 674 fish species, is currently unknown.1 8  The numbers
become even more alarming when focusing on specific coastal waters of
the country traditionally recognized for their high concentrations of
preferred fish stocks.' 9 Scientists estimate that the U.S. fishery landings
have room to grow by up to 3 million metric tons if only the fisheries
could be rebuilt and current harvesting were adjusted to allow for such
long-term potential yields. 20
Of course, any reduction in the landings of commercial fishermen
represents a blow to an industry vital to many local communities and to
the U.S. economy as well.2' In 1998, New England commercial fisheries
alone landed almost 595 million pounds of fish, generating $540 million in
dockside revenues and contributing substantially to the Northeastern
economy.22 On the West Coast, where reductions in groundfish stocks,
such as rockfish and lingcod, have dramatically affected the landings of
coastal fishermen, estimated economic losses for coastal communities in
Oregon, Washington, and California range from $3 million to $15
million.23 Nationally, "[t]he American fishing industry is a $25 billion
wholesale business which employs 300,000 people, and had over $3
Baker, Undersec'y and Adm'r, Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Commerce).
16 Donald Sutherland, U.S. Fish Harvesters Up on Financial Rocks, ENV'T NEWS
SERVICE, Apr. 25, 2000, available at 2000 WL.
17 Hearing on the Reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transp., 106th Cong. (Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Hearing on
Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization] (statement of Penelope Dalton, Assistant Adm'r,
Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., U.S. Dep't of Commerce).
18 Sutherland, supra note 16.
19 See Hearing on Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization, supra note 17 (statement of
Penelope Dalton, Assistant Adm'r, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., U.S. Dep't of
Commerce). "And in New England, the percentage of overfished stocks in 1999 was
aproximately 50 percent." Id.
Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Editorial, Lost At Sea: West Coast Groundfish Stocks are Devastated By Overfishing;
Magnuson-Stevens Act Needs Strengthening, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 27, 2000, at
B6.
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billion in landing revenues for 1998. ' 24 Additionally, recreational anglers
(deep-sea fishing) caught another 312 million fish in 1998, with an
unspecified but clearly discernible impact on local boating and charter
businesses.25 Overall, the U.S. is, by catch, the fifth largest fishing nation
in the world, harvesting 10 billion pounds of fish annually.26 It is also the
world's third largest seafood exporter, with over $2.3 billion in exports in
1998.27
Pitting the conservation needs of an increasingly limited resource
against the overwhelming economic and social dependence of many
coastal communities on the fishing industry obviously poses a daunting
challenge. It is a challenge that falls almost exclusively on the
Department of Commerce's NMFS and on eight regional fishery councils,
created under the 1976 Magnuson Act.28 NMFS was at one time relegated
to the collection of data other minor roles in management of the
fisheries. 29 Today, however, with the adoption of the Magnuson Act and
then the SFA amendments, NMFS is extremely active in the day-to-day
oversight of fishing practices in the United States, issuing "more that 400
rules a year... governing where, when and how fishermen can fish."
30
The regional councils actually create the Fishery Management
Plans ("FMPs") determining "when, where, how and how many of each
fish or related group of fish and shellfish can be caught each year." 31 Each
council's plans, however, are only advisory in nature and must be
approved by the Secretary of Commerce, acting through NMFS.32 At the
heart of the controversy surrounding fisheries management are these
FMPs, given their "effect [on] both the survival of a species and the
24 Sutherland, supra note 16. The commercial harvest in 1998 totaled 9.6 billion pounds
of fish and shellfish worth an estimated $3.7 billion. See Cohn, supra note 5.
25 Cohn, supra note 5.
26 Sutherland, supra note 16.
27 Id. Interestingly enough, the U.S. in 1998 also incurred a $6.9 billion trade deficit in
fisheries products. See Subcomm. on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans,
supra note 15.
28 See Cohn, supra note 5.
29 See id.
30 Id. (NMFS is fourth-highest among federal agencies in the issuing of rules and
regulations).
31Id.
32 Id.
8292002)
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economic health of the fishing industry and many communities." 33 While
the make-up of the regional councils originally was dominated by
fishermen and others aligned with the commercial fishing industry, much
has changed over the course of the past ten years. 34 Today, the councils'
membership includes not only fishermen, but academics, conservationists,
regional and state fishery officials, and NMFS regional directors,
transforming the council process into a microcosm of the national debate
raging amongst the varied interests.35
Obviously, underlying each of the councils' and NMFS's actions
are foundations rooted in the statute which originally created the council
process, the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and in its subsequent amendments,
the Sustainable Fisheries Act. The Magnuson Act was adopted with two
stated goals in mind.36 First, the bill sought to exclude foreign fishermen
from America's coastal waters and to encourage the development of the
U.S. domestic fishing fleet and processing industry.37 The second stated
goal was to preserve the fishery stocks in U.S. coastal waters.3' The Act
sought to meet these objectives by "establishing a 200-mile fishery
conservation zone and asserting U.S. management authority over fish
within the conservation zone, as well as over anadromous species such as
salmon throughout their migratory range." 39
By all measures, the legislation was immensely successful in
meeting its first goal-it virtually eliminated foreign fishing vessels and
processors and significantly aided the development of the domestic fishing
fleet.40 For example, between implementation of the Magnuson Act and
1995, "the number of commercial groundfish vessels in New England has
increased by 70 percent, and the number of fishermen has risen by 130
33 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RCED-00-69, FISHERY MANAGEMENT:
PROBLEMS REMAIN WITH NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS ACT (2000) [hereinafter GAO, FISHERY MANAGEMENT].
34See Cohn, supra note 5.
35See id. "Many Council meetings are now several days longer to provide for the level
of public input generated by the imposition of new and often very complex management
measures." Hearing on Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization, supra note 17 (testimony of
Thomas R. Hill, Chairman, New England Fishery Management Council).
36 David A. Dana, Overcoming the Political Tragedy of the Commons: Lesson Learned
From the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 833, 840 (1997).37 ld.
38 Id.
39 141 CONG. REC. S247-48 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Sen. John Kerry, D-
Mass.).
40 See id.
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percent. ' 41 Not surprisingly however, the second stated goal has not been
achieved, as the two objectives were somewhat incompatible
fundamentally and since passage of the Magnuson Act, "depletion of
offshore fishery populations has worsened. 'A2 Part of the problem was
clearly the increased size of the domestic fleet, but even more troublesome
was the self-regulating power vested in the council process.43 Recall that
until very recently many of the eight regional councils "have consisted
almost exclusively of commercial fishermen," 44 and it is not surprising
that as a result of this uniformity many of the councils "resisted taking
effective measures to prevent or cure overfishing.
' 5
III. THE SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES ACT AND NATIONAL STANDARD
EIGHT
A. The Sustainable Fisheries Act
It was in this vein that the Sustainable Fisheries Act was passed in
1996, amending the Magnuson Act and dramatically altering the roles of
both NMFS and the regional councils. 46  The SFA was an apparent
attempt to remedy the conservation failures of the Magnuson Act, as
"[s]tamps of conservation groups [were] imprinted upon numerous
provision of the SFA.A 7 There was noticeably less discretion granted the
councils in responding to identified fisheries in crisis as the legislation
required FMPs to rebuild stocks as quickly as possible (no longer than 10
years),48 and required NMFS to identify and conserve "essential fish
habitat" ("EFH"). 49 In addition, the SFA issued a five-year moratorium on
41 Id.
42 Dana, supra note 36.
43 See id. at 842.
44 Id.
45 Id. "In some regions ... the council members are no longer perceived as stewards of
the public resource, providing fair and balanced representation, but are seen as protectors
of special economic interests." 141 CONG. REC. S247-48 (statement of Sen. John Kerry,
D-Mass.).
46 See Dana, supra note 36, at 843.
47 Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustainable
Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799, 805 (1997). "[E]nvironmental groups representing
general public sentiment were extremely active in the Magnuson Act reauthorization
process." Dana, supra note 36, at 844.
8 The Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 109(e)(4)(A)(i) (1996).
4 9 Id. § 108(a)(7).
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individual fishing quotas ("IFQs"), a controversial measure designed to
limit overcapacity and overcapitalization within the industry by granting
quotas based on prior performance,5° and "also established new
requirements regarding bycatch-fish that fishermen catch incidentally
when fishing for another species."
51
The bycatch requirement was actually added as another "standard"
to a list of seven rules promulgated in the original Magnuson Act. 52 These
"national standards" were to serve as necessary conservation-based
guidelines in the development of the council management plans (FMPs)
and NMFS regulations. In general, the conservation-friendly philosophy
espoused in these original commandments was only strengthened in the
SFA as several of the original standards were substantively modified.
5 4
Along with the bycatch standard however, two other standards were also
added by the SFA, and one of them, now identified as National Standard
Eight, has generated a firestorm of controversy.
55
B. National Standard Eight
National Standard Eight states:
Conservation and management measures shall, consistent
with the conservation requirements of this Act (including
the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of overfished
stocks), take into account the importance of fishery
resources to fishing communities in order to (A) provide
for the sustained participation of such communities, and
(B) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic
impacts on such communities.
56
50 See id. § 108(e).
51 Hsu & Wilen, supra note 47, at 805.
52 See id. at 805-06.
53 Id. at 802-03.
54 Id. at 806. "[T]he first national standard, mandating that management achieve the
'optimum yield' from each fishery, previously defined as 'maximum sustainable yield'..
has been altered to allow only that maximum yield be reduced by any such relevant
[economic, social, or ecological] factors. This prevents councils from raising allowable
harvests in response to local pressure for larger allocations." Id.
55 Hearing on Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization, supra note 17 (testimony of Paul
Parker, Commercial Hook and Line Fisherman Executive Dir., Cape Cod Commercial
Hook Fishermen's Ass'n, Member of the Board, Marine Conservation Network).
56 The Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 106(b)(8) (1996).
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As is evident from the language, Congress did not intend this standard as a
trump of conservation measures,57 but as an additional barrier or
protection to burdensome regulation. 58 As stated last year by Paul Parker
of the Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen's Association in testimony
before the Senate Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries:
Although economic impacts must be considered, they
cannot take precedence over the Magnuson-Stevens Act's
mandate to conserve fish. In an instance where several
alternatives are equally protective of marine fish, but have
varying degrees of adverse economic impacts to fishermen,
then NMFS should choose the alternative with the least
economic impact. The Regulatory Flexibility Act and
National Standard 8 should not be used to undercut
fisheries conservation.
59
Still, despite the limitations expressly placed on the effect of this standard,
it is clearly not to be ignored. But since 1996, the primary complaint from
those within and representing commercial fishing interests has been that
agency action on the part of both NMFS and the management councils has
largely disregarded both National Standard Eight and the Regulatory
Flexibility Act ("RFA").6° Maggie Raymond, representing a groundfish
group-the Associated Fisheries of Maine-in recent testimony given
before a Senate subcommittee argued:
57 See S. REP. No. 104-276, § 107, at 14 (1996). "This standard... is not intended to be
used as a basis for circumventing conservation requirements." Id.
58 See Hearing on Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization, supra note 17 (testimony of Paul
Parker, Commercial Hook and Line Fisherman Executive Dir., Cape Cod Commercial
Hook Fishermen's Ass'n, Member of the Board, Marine Conservation Network).
59 Id. The Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA") was passed in 1996 and requires the
agency to perform a regulatory flexibility analysis before promulgating a final rule. The
analysis must include a description of alternatives designed to minimize any significant
economic impact of the rule on small entities which was considered by the agency, and a
statement of the reasons why each one of such alternatives was rejected.
Sharon Gwinn et al., A Review of Developments in U.S. Ocean and Coastal Law January
1-October 31, 1997,4 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 173, 202 (1999).
60 Review of Fishery Conservation Act Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Fisheries of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 106th Cong. (July 29, 1999)
(testimony of Maggie Raymond, Associated Fisheries of Maine).
2002]
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This brings me to the most important point I wish to make
today that being the SFA and NMFS guidelines despite the
addition of National Standard 8, simply do not allow
management decisions to consider the social and economic
needs of fishing communities .... The NMFS guidelines
allow consideration of the needs of fishing communities
only as a means of adjusting the rebuilding period and only
when that rebuilding period is less than ten years. We are
very concerned that, unless the balance is restored, it will
be impossible to maintain our traditional dependence upon
the fisheries.
6 1
The frustration expressed here has been begrudgingly recognized by
NMFS, but as yet only limited changes have occurred.62  As a result,
National Standard Eight (and also the RFA) has recently served as a
launching pad for several lawsuits. 63  Moreover, a Congressionally
ordered General Accounting Office ("GAO") study of the problem was
just completed in April, 2000.'
C. GAO Report on Fishery Management
The GAO study is particularly telling as to the nature and extent of
the problems involving council incorporation of National Standard Eight.
At the request of several members of Congress, the GAO investigated
NMFS compliance with three provisions of the Magnuson Act,
specifically focusing on NMFS's use of scientific data in regulatory
61 Id. Ms. Raymond goes on to say, "[W]e are committed to sustainable fisheries...
[b]ut the events of the past few years and, especially, the potential impacts of the
Sustainable Fisheries Act have shaken that faith and raised concerns that our community
may be changed forever." Id.
62 See Hearing on Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization, supra note 17 (statement of
Penelope Dalton, Assistant Adm'r, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., U.S. Dep't of
Commerce) ("One of NOAA Fisheries' highest priorities is to improve our social and
economic analyses."). On May 1, 1998, NMFS did promulgate guidelines for
consideration of these issues, but these guidelines have been criticized as silent on the
role of industry in "minimiz[ing] adverse impacts to their communities." GAO, FISHERY
MANAGEMENT, supra note 33, at 16.
63 See Economics Impact of Fisheries Service Regulations Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans of the House Comm. on Res., 106th Cong.
(Apr. 29, 1999) (statement of Penelope Dalton, Assistant Adm'r, Nat'l Marine Fisheries
Serv., U.S. Dep't of Commerce).64 GAO, FISHERY MANAGEMENT, supra note 33.
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development, its implementation of the "essential fish habitat"
requirements outlined in the SFA, and most notably, adherence to the
principles established in National Standard Eight regarding the "economic
importance of fishery resources to fishing communities as [NMFS] adopts
measures to manage fishery resources. ' 65 Although the GAO found little
wrong regarding NMFS compliance with its use of scientific data and
identification of "essential fish habitats,"66 it was extremely critical of
NMFS's handling of National Standard Eight.67
The report began its review of Standard Eight by pointing out that
"[a]lthough NMFS does consider the economic importance of fishing to
fishing communities, this consideration concentrates on identifying how
adversely a community would be affected by the measures and not
necessarily on how to minimize that impact to provide for the sustained
participation of those communities in the fishery."68 Closely related was
the GAO's criticism that NMFS guidelines regarding Standard Eight
compliance do not in any way involve or provide a role for the
communities affected.69 Simply stated, the GAO asserted that the regional
councils and NMFS needed to spend more time in consideration of
methods or alternatives that at least had the possibility of mitigating the
effects of harsh conservation measures. 7" It should also be highlighted
that since the implementation of SFA in 1996 only six of the thirty-five
council documents submitted to NMFS for review have been even
partially disapproved on the basis of any Standard Eight deficiencies.
7 1
Procedurally, the GAO also recommended that NMFS consider the
economic impacts earlier in the decision-making process, noting that
although the Magnuson Act does give priority to the conservation of
depleted stocks, the economic impacts still had to be considered in
developing conservation alternatives.72 The GAO report found incidences
where possible economic impacts were not considered at all until "after
management alternatives [had] already been developed., 73
65 Id. at 3 (Letter to Congressional Committees and Requesters).
66 Id. at 3-4.
67 Id. at 28.
68 Id. at 15.
69 Id. at 16.
70 GAO, FISHERY MANAGEMENT, supra note 33.
71 Id. at 17.
72 Id. at 19
73 Id. "In some instances, the decision-making process had progressed so far that there
was little time to consider economic impacts." Id.
2002]
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Most importantly, the GAO focused a great deal on the notion that
the quality of any economic analysis was directly dependent on the
availability of economic information. 74 In fact, common complainants to
GAO regarding the common shortage of essential economic data were
often regional council representatives, noting a general lack of data
regarding: (1) crew employment information (number, payrate, and days
worked); "(2) the economic relationships between those that buy the catch
and those that catch it; (3) the production costs for such items as fuel, ice,
equipment, and repairs; (4) the levels of debt and equity levels in the
industry; and (5) the operating characteristics of import, export, and
domestic markets." 75 NMFS officials also acknowledged that the "lack of
basic financial data makes it difficult to demonstrate the effect of
management measures on the industry and its private companies.
'
,
76
Of course, an obvious constraint on NMFS's ability to gather data
was a limited pool of funds and NMFS's failure to budget the necessary
dollars to adequately address the shortcoming. 7 The GAO found that
NMFS could only afford to employ thirty-three economists nationwide,
who were responsible for the economic analyses required by the
Magnuson-Stevens Act and National Standard Eight in addition to similar
analyses required by the RFA78 and other federal mandates affecting
fisheries issues. 79 The GAO noted that despite NMFS's acknowledgement
of the problem, the agency continued to budget inadequate funding to
properly resolve the problem. 0
Finally, the GAO sought to emphasize that despite the difficulty
incurred in the gathering of necessary data, NMFS needed to decide
whether its interpretation of National Standard Eight would be limited to
the individual fisherman or to fishing communities as a whole.8 ' Certainly
the affects of any government regulation reach far beyond the fishermen
and their families. The GAO Report emphasized that "people who are a
part of the industry infrastructure that supplies the gear, the port facilities,
the ice, and the fuel to the fishermen as well as other local businesses that
provide general services may also experience reduced revenues or face
4 Id. at 17-19.
7 5 1d. at 18.
76 Sutherland, supra note 16.
77See GAO, FISHERY MANAGEMENT, supra note 33, at 18-19.
78 The Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1996).
79GAO, FISHERY MANAGEMENT, supra note 33, at 18.
80 Id.
Id. at 18.
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unemployment when fishing is curtailed. ' 2 While the GAO Report did
appear to leave NMFS room to negotiate its position regarding National
Standard Eight's scope, the Report's clear preference for an expansive and
community-based interpretation, its unambiguous criticism of NMFS
priorities in the decision-making process, and the acknowledged
shortcomings of data gathering and analysis, should have been interpreted
by NMFS officials as nothing short of a resounding shot across the bow.
83
D. Litigation
Many of the themes brought to light in the GAO Report have
readily been discussed by the few courts to review the reasonableness of
NMFS's regulatory actions and their compliance with National Standard
Eight and the RFA. In fact, the GAO Report briefly spotlighted two such
cases.8 4 NMFS officials responded by emphasizing the cases were indeed
"wake-up calls" as to the need for a better accounting of the economic
impacts, but they also indicated that there were several cases already
decided where NMFS methodology and procedure as it relates to
economic impacts were overwhelming upheld.85 So, while many within
the commercial fishing industry have in the last few years chosen to fight
back by addressing their concerns to the courts, the results have been
mixed at best, and only created additional confusion as the different
circuits have split and gone their separate ways.
1. North Carolina Fisheries Ass 'n v. Daley86
In North Carolina Fisheries Ass 'n v. Daley, an Eastern District of
Virginia Court ruled that the Secretary of Commerce had failed to comply
with National Standard Eight by not conducting an appropriate economic
analysis in the establishment of an annual quota for the summer flounder
82 Id. at 17-18.
83 In its recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce and the Director of NMFS, the
GAO suggested that NMFS "[d]etermine what resources [it] might redirect to help ensure
that the full range of economic alternatives are considered early enough in the decision-
making process to be useful in minimizing the adverse economic impacts of fishery
conservation and management decisions." Id.
84Id. at 20-21 (The two cases are (1) North Carolina Fisheries Ass 'n v. Daley; and (2)
Southern Offshore Fishing Ass n v. Daley, discussed infra).
85 GAO, FISHERY MANAGEMENT, supra note 33, at 21.
86 27 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D.Va. 1998).
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fishery,87 despite having been ordered to do so by the same court in an
earlier proceeding.88 Apparently, in calculating the quota, NMFS utilized
a stock assessment to determine the number of summer flounder in the
fishery that was partly based on all reported dockside landings for a
fishing year.89 The flaw in NMFS methodology was its tendency to begin
computation of the quota without the arrival of the dockside landing
numbers for the immediately preceding season and its subsequent
substitution of numbers from previous years.
90
NMFS was found by the court to have formulated its 1997 quota
using 1995 numbers because the 1996 numbers were not available. To
the extent the 1995 landing numbers included an overfished amount of
592,748 pounds more than allowed by the 1995 quota, this amount was
subsequently subtracted from the 1997 quota. 92 Later the 1997 quota was
again reduced because the 1996 overfish numbers eventually arrived.93 As
a result of this series of reductions, the final quota for 1997 stood at just
fifty-nine percent of the original proposed quota.94 In 1998 because of
similar-type findings by the agency, double reductions again occurred,
subtracting almost 400,000 pounds for 1997 averages.
95
In establishing this quota, NMFS did not conduct what it termed an
economic analysis, as required by both the RFA and National Standard
Eight of the Magnuson Act, until ordered to do so by the court.9 6 The
economic analysis conducted, however, was extremely limited, and relied
on NMFS internal criteria.97 Specifically, one of the triggers utilized
asked whether "the action result[ed] in revenue loss of more than 5 percent
for 20 percent or more of the participants." 98 Curiously, NMFS's own
analysis determined that fifty-seven percent of North Carolina's vessels
were projected to have revenue losses of greater than five percent, and that
forty-three percent of the North Carolina flounder fleet might actually
87 See id.
88 See North Carolina Fisheries Ass'n v. Daley, 16 F. Supp. 2d 647 (E.D.Va. 1997).
89 North Carolina Fisheries Ass 'n, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 653.
90 See id. at 654-58.
91 Id. at 654.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See id. at 656-57.
95 North Carolina Fisheries Ass 'n, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 656-57.
96 See id. at 657.
97 Id. at 658.
98 Id.
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experience reduced revenues of twenty-five percent or more.99
Amazingly, despite having triggered one of its own internally-established
criteria, NMFS still concluded that there were no significant economic
impacts from the quota and. even asserted that the previous year's
overfishing would mitigate the losses any flounder fishermen suffered.'00
The court found such analysis to be in complete violation of both
the RFA and National Standard Eight of the Magnuson Act, 10 1 and
determined NMFS actions to be both arbitrary and capricious. 0 2 The
court went on to conclude that NMFS purposely skewed the results of the
study to justify an untenable position.' 03 "The so-called economic
analysis was not actually what it was purported to be or ordered by this
Court. It entirely failed to consider the effect on fishing communities or
small entities. It failed to consider the economics as it may have affected
actual fishermen."' 1 4 Additionally, the court provided some guidance as
to the limit of NMFS's power to regulate, stating:
[t]he Secretary's authority to set quotas should serve as a
regulatory guidepost for the conservation of the fishery. It
should not be used as a buzzsaw to mow down whole
fishing communities in order to save some fish. The
Magnuson Act and the RFA were specifically enacted to
avoid such a situation from happening.1
0 5
The Eastern District's compelling comments are more than telling.
The agency's refusal to account for economic impacts was readily and
repeatedly called to task by the court. The strong words and sanction on
the part of the court also suggest at least an implicit duty under National
Standard Eight to mitigate the damages of regulation.'0 6 In other words, at
99 Id. at 659.
Id.
101 See North Carolina Fisheries Ass 'n, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 659-62. "After reviewing the
Secretary's Analysis, this Court finds that the Secretary has completely abdicated his
responsibilities under the Magnuson Act . . . . [T]he Secretary stubbornly argues that
legal constraints posed by his own regulations override his clear statutory duty under
National Standard 8 to minimize adverse economic impacts on communities." Id. at 662.
102 Id. at 667.
103 Id. at 667-68.
ld. at 667.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 666. "[T]he purposes of National Standard 8 do not concern fishery
conservation in isolation. To the contrary, the express terms of National Standard 8
8392002]
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least according to this court, the express .requirements of National
Standard Eight suggest that the livelihoods and families of fishermen must
always be considered in balance with NMFS's stated goal of protecting
the fish above all else.
A similar result can also be found in Southern Offshore Fishing
Ass 'n v. Daley,10 7 where the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida ruled that NMFS had failed to perform the necessary economic
analysis to justify a fifty percent reduction in the annual shark quota.108
Whereas the court did not fault NMFS for the conservation-based rationale
utilized to warrant the restrictions, it did find that a significant, albeit
small, fishing community did rely almost exclusively on the shark quota,
and thus had to be accounted for in the FMP formation.
10 9
Notably, the court in Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n found the
violation to have occurred specifically under the RFA and as a result
prescribed a remedy dictated by that particular legislation." ° Still, the
court pointed out that "[t]he same remedy is appropriate for the
Secretary's violation of National Standard Eight .... ,' The overlapping
nature of the two statutes evidenced in both cases should only add to the
importance of considering such economic impacts in finalizing FMPs.
2. A.ML. Int'l, Inc. v. Daley'
12
A.ML. Int'l, Inc. represents the ultimate contrast with the ruling in
North Carolina Fisheries Ass n, as well as Southern Offshore Fishing
Ass'n. The plaintiffs in A.ML. Int'l, Inc. were mid-Atlantic and New
England companies specializing in the harvest, processing, and export of
spiny dogfish. 1 3  Spiny dogfish landings accounted for significant
percentages of the total landings in several traditional New England
fishing towns, such as Plymouth, where seventy-four percent of the total
fish landed and ninety-six percent of the total pounds of fish landed were
provide for a balancing of conservation interests against the economic rights of
commercial fishermen and fishing communities." Id.
107 995 F. Supp. 1411 (1998).
108 See GAO FISHERY MANAGEMENT, supra note 33, at 21.
109 Id.
110 Southern Offshore Fishing Ass 'n, 995 F. Supp. at 1437.
III Id. at 1437, n.36.
112 107 F. Supp. 2d 90 (2000).
113 See id. at 92.
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spiny dogfish. 114 The suit was brought to invalidate the implementation of
the NMFS-approved spiny dogfish Fishery Management Plan
("SDFMP"). 11  Even before trial, it -was readily conceded by the
government that "the quota restrictions contained in the plan [would]
likely have the effect of shutting down the spiny dogfish industry for at
least the next five years.""16 So, similar to the findings in North Carolina
Fisheries Ass 'n the plaintiffs sought to have the SDFMP ruled an arbitrary
and capricious action that violated both National Standard Eight of the
Magnuson Act and the RFA.
117
The district court engaged in an extremely thorough discussion of
the SDFMP, NMFS's actions, and the plaintiffs' specific complaints.
While some limited criticisms were leveled against the government action,
the court found NMFS's actions to be appropriate within the law and
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 118
Specifically addressing National Standard Eight, the court relied
heavily on the explicit acknowledgement within the standard, "that
deliberations regarding the importance of fishery resources to affected
fishing communities 'must not compromise the achievement of
conservation requirements."" '1' 9 The court did recognize that all other
things being equal, it would find for an alternative with lower economic
impacts, but that when the conservation benefits clearly favor one
alternative over the other, National Standard Eight would not be relevant
to the determination.12
0
The plaintiffs had contended that the SDFMP was not in
compliance with the National Standard Eight because:
(1) [T]here was no attempt to minimize economic
consequences, (2) the descriptions of economic impacts,
fishery demographics and the fishing communities [were]
inadequate, (3) the consideration of alternative measures
was inadequate, and most importantly (4) the plan shuts
down an entire industry. For example, the plaintiffs assert
that they will suffer revenue losses of thirty (30) to one
114 Id. at 93. "[I]n 1999, more than forty (40) percent of all fish caught by weight in the
Northwest Atlantic were spiny dogfish." Id. at 92.
115 See id. at 93.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118See A.M.L. Int'l, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d at 108.
119Id. at 102-03.
120 See id. at 103.
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hundred (100) percent, and the elimination of at least two
hundred (200) jobs in the processing sector.12 1
The court however found that the economic impacts of the SDFMP
were adequately accounted for and that in fact the agency had "concluded
that without the measures contained in the SDFMP... the fishery [would]
collapse completely within two or three years . . . creating drastically
worse economic consequences than the temporary measures contained in
the SDFMP."'
122
Additionally, the court found that NMFS and the councils had
carefully evaluated twelve other alternative schemes but had concluded
that the rebuilding schedule outlined in the SDFMP would produce results
most consistent with the demands of the Magnuson Act.' 23  The
alternatives were rejected by NMFS because they did not comply fully
with other requirements of the Magnuson Act, they did not provide long-
term economic benefits better than the SDFMP adopted, and most notably,
the alternatives did not conform to the ten-year time limit for rebuilding
the fishery. 124 Finally, the plaintiffs contention that a total shutdown of
the industry should be enough to trigger National Standard Eight was
dispensed of by the court because National Standard. Eight does not
expressly prohibit a total closure of a fishery.'
25
Certainly, the court's arguments are well-taken. Still troubling,
however, is the court's reliance on agency discretion in determining that
the other twelve alternatives did not suffice. The basis employed by the
court is obviously critical. Was the agency's SDFMP responding
immediately to the gloomy two to three year prognosis of an industry
crash, or the ten-year target ceiling for rebuilding fish stocks, as
established by the Magnuson Act?
Also, compared with the North Carolina Fisheries Ass 'n decision,
this court could certainly be interpreted as representing the opposite
position regarding the weight economic impact should gamer relative to a
plan's conservation effect. This Massachusetts district court concluded,
"[a]s a sick person must undergo painful surgery and then convalesce for a
short time in order to regain his health, a sick fishery must suffer this
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id
124 See A.M.L. Int'l, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d at 103.
125 ..
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drastic procedure and then conserve itself for a short time in order to
recover its full vitality."'
' 26
It is possible that a common understanding of National Standard
Eight was shared by these two courts and that the results are only
distinguishable on the facts and the differences in agency approach. Such
a conclusion, however, would fundamentally demean the express
requirement in National Standard Eight-that any FMP fully account for
and minimize its actual economic impacts .127 More likely, however, is
the possibility of conflicting interpretations as to the degree of impact
National Standard Eight can have on the implementation of management
plans generally consistent with the other conservation-based national
standards. In other words, at issue is the exact scope of the phrase "take
into account."' 128 Can NMFS satisfy National Standard Eight simply by
considering and then discarding management options that might better
minimize the economic impacts?
Whereas the court in North Carolina Fisheries Ass 'n seemed to
adopt a common sense interpretation of the standard and its scope, 129 the
court in A.ML. Int'l, Inc. relied on its understanding of congressional
intent, stating, "[tihis terrible and unfortunate consequence, however, was
readily anticipated by Congress when it amended the Magnuson-Stevens
Act in 1996. "13O But the Committee Report detailing the intentions of S.
39 (Sustainable Fisheries Act) does not mention any standard necessarily
trumping another.' 31 Nor should it be assumed from concluding National
Standard Eight does not circumvent the other national standards, that
Congress intended economic impacts to be entirely secondary to
conservation. 132 As Andy Rosenberg, former deputy director of NMFS,
126 Id. at 108.
127 The Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 106(b)(8) (1996).
128 See id.
129 27 F. Supp. 2d 650, 661-66 (E.D.Va. 1998). The Eastern District of Virginia court
presumed without discussion the necessary accounting of economic impacts, and instead
focused on the scope of the phrase, "fishing community." See id. at 663.
130 A.M.L. Int'l, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d, at 107-08. "Significantly, Congress recognized
that 'there is no requirement in the Magnuson-Stevens Act to require fishery management
councils to try to minimize the adverse economic impacts of fisheries regulations on
fishing communities ... [It is] clear that these economic considerations are not designed
to trump conservation considerations in the process of developing fishery management
plans."' Id. at 108 n.28 (quoting Sen. Snowe, 142 Cong. Rec. S10794, 10825 (Sept. 18,
1996)).
131 See S. REP. No. 104-276, § 107 (1996).
132 See Beth Baker, Fisheries Management Faces Many Challenges, 50 BIOSCIENCE,
Aug. 1, 2000, at 652.
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has stated, "[flirst conserve and make sure you don't overfish, but do it in
a way that make[s] sense economically. You can't optimize both, but you
have to consider both and look at tradeoffs.' ' 133  Unfortunately, these
tradeoffs are the subject of criticism from one side or the other, and
mandating to all parties, including the courts, that both conservation and
economic impacts be accounted for seems an impossible task. 134 The two
goals are necessarily at odds.
35
IV. SOLUTIONS TO RESOLVE THE IMPASSE
Of course, to focus exclusively on the Magnuson-Stevens Act's
apparently mutually exclusive objectives (with the addition of National
Standard Eight by the SFA), is really to miss the forest for the trees. As
already emphasized, many fisheries have been severely depleted by
overfishing and have been in need of protection. 136 In response, NMFS,
under the auspices of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, has adopted fishery
management plans that have closed specific fishing grounds, significantly
limited fishing seasons, imposed catch quotas, and restricted gear types
and crew sizes.' 37 Obviously, all of these options implicitly translate into
increased economic hardships for the fishermen affected. None of these
solutions, however, appear to have worked, as the endangered status of
most fisheries persists' 38 and NMFS finds itself increasingly in court.1 39
Why have these remedies not worked?
At the heart of the matter-NMFS and the regional councils have
fundamentally misappropriated their efforts because "[d]espite these
measures, too many boats are still chasing too few fish." 140 In other
words, overfishing is in large part perpetuated by continued overcapacity
133 Id.
See id.
135See id. ("Competing conservation and economic interests lead to what may be one of
NMFS's worst problems-litigation.").
136 See Hearing on Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization, supra note 17 (statement of
Penelope Dalton, Assistant Adm'r, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., U.S. Dep't of
Commerce).
137See Donald Sutherland, Fishy Accounting: Bankrupt Seas, 15 EARTH ISLAND J., Sept.
22, 2000, at 26.
138 See Hearing on Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization, supra note 17 (statement of
Penelope Dalton, Assistant Adm'r, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., U.S. Dep't of
Commerce).
139Baker, supra note 132.
140 Sutherland, supra note 137.
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within the different fisheries. 14 1 Overcapacity is defined as "investments
in fishing capacity that are currently or are likely to become idle for
significant periods." 1
42
. The problem in NMFS's current approach 143 is really two-fold.
First, by frequently overlooking overcapitalization as an issue and instead
advancing the likes of the current regulatory regime, NMFS has come
down decidedly in favor of conservation, in staunch denial of National
Standard Eight and of the impacts such regulations have on fishing
communities. 144 Jim Lone, Chairman of the Pacific Fishery Management
Council, recently testified before Congress:
However, there is a darker vision, which could easily occur
if we are not able to strategically alter the course of current
management. That is, we could continue attempting to
manage an overcapitalized fleet in the face of declining
resource abundance and the necessity to meet stock
rebuilding mandates. This will most certainly result in
even shorter fishing seasons, smaller trip limits, higher
discard rates, and the continuous inability to accurately
account for fishery-related mortalities. Many people now
actively fishing will not be able to meet their basic financial
responsibilities and will be forced from the fishery by a
governed economic demise or outright bankruptcy; impacts
to coastal communities dependent on [such] fisheries will
be disastrous.1
45
141 See Hsu & Wilen, supra note 47, at 806 ("While the SFA contains some notable
conservation advances, it does little to address the most fundamental cause of overfishing
and waste-the chronic overcapitalization of fishing industries."). "Each time fish stocks
decrease and the number of vessels remain the same the harvesting industry becomes less
solvent." Sutherland, supra note 137.
142 ANDREW G. READ & EUGENE H. BUCK, COMMERCIAL FISHING: ECONOMIC AID AND
CAPACITY REDUCTION, CRS REPORT 97-441 ENR at 1 (1997). "In a purely static sense,
overcapitalization refers to the existence of more capital applied in an industry than is
necessary for the most efficient operation." Id. at 1 n.3.
143 In fairness, NMFS has addressed capacity in numerous instances, as will be discussed
shortly. Still, this note argues that reducing excess capacity has not yet been the
fundamental focus of NMFS policies, which instead have concentrated on superficial
regulations of this essentially static industry.
1 Hearing on the Decline of the West Coast Groundfish Fishery Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 107th Cong. (Jan. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
West Coast Groundfish Hearing] (testimony of Jim Lone, Chairman, Pacific Fishery
Management Council).
145 Id. (emphasis added).
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Additionally, it -is noteworthy that by continuing on its current
course, NMFS may actually be exacerbating the problem. By restricting
when, where, and how specific species are caught, NMFS only feeds the
"race for fish" mentality it is attempting to eliminate.146
Of course, one might expect existing NMFS restrictions to
eventually take their toll-there should already be overwhelming
casualties from the harsh financial impacts imposed by prior and existing
NMFS regulations-a reduction in fleet capacity by attrition alone
(although inconsistent with National Standard Eighlt). Fishermen,
however, have proven to be a relatively stubborn bunch,1 and not nearly
enough fishermen have left the industry to address overcrowding.' 48 For
example, in the New England groundfish fishery (cod, haddock, etc.),
where considerable portions of the Georges Bank, the fishery's most
prized fishing area, have been closed since 1994, "[r]elatively few
fishermen have surrendered their permits to catch cod and other
groundfish despite page after bureaucratic page of regulations governing
everything from their net size to the number of days they can spend at
sea."
, 149
There are of course several explanations for such sustained
overcrowding within each fishery. Most notably, fishermen enjoy their
jobs, "despite the boom-and-bust nature of their business and federal
statistics showing that fishing is the nation's most dangerous
profession." 150 Few would dispute the notion that fishing and love of the
146 See READ & BUCK, supra note 142, at 1 ("Attempts to regulate the total amount of
fish captured (e.g., through total allowable catch ["TAC"] restrictions) may induce
further investment, as the fastest vessels with the best equipment will probably fare best
in the 'race for fish' that usually results from closed seasons or overall harvest quotas.").
147 See Scott Harper & Lane DeGregory, Hard Word, Little to Show-And a Foundering
Future, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Dec. 17, 1995, at Al ("Throughout the crisis, the notion of
government limits on the number of people who can fish in the sea, of mandatory catch
reports and ocean closures have chafed many New England fishermen, whose don't-
tread-on-me stubbornness is renowned.").
148Mac Daniel, Hanging on Rules, Fewer Fish Can't Sink Love of Profession, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2000, at B1. This is not to say that actual numbers have not decreased.
But see Harper & DeGregory, supra note 147. "In the 1960s, before the federal
government began regulating fish, 50 processing plants were in business in Gloucester,
Mass. About a dozen are left. Less than 10 years ago, 450 fishing boats docked in
Gloucester's horseshoe-shaped harbor. The fleet now numbers about 125." Id.
149 Daniel, supra note 148.
150 .,
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ocean are "in your blood."'' Also, demographics and simple economics
dictate devotion to a way of life where little is required by way of
education, but the pay can be exceptionally good. 152 Finally, as implied
previously, the federal government actively "set the stage for today's over-
sized fishing fleet ... with the passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Act" in
1976.151 "By chasing out the foreign boats that fished off New England's
coast, and offering 'federal subsidies for the construction of new U.S.
fishing boats, Congress fueled a great expansion. ....,,54
Such analysis clearly suggests NMFS and the regional councils are
hurting the economic prospects of fishing communities with ineffective
regulation, while at the same time violating the conservation measures of
the Magnuson-Stevens Act by not addressing more enthusiastically the
overcapitalization of the industry. A new approach with a new emphasis
is clearly needed.
The federal government has certainly considered several other
approaches in the past and implemented them, albeit somewhat
imperfectly. 55 At one time or another, proposals involving economic aid
(subsidies), individual transferable quotas ("ITQ"s), and direct capacity
reduction, either by vessel buyback or license retirement, have been
tried.' 56 All three offer advantages over the current system but also have
their share of critics.'5 7 The critical question, and the focus of this Note's
concluding analysis, is which alternative is best for all parties involved
and should be implemented on a more comprehensive scale.
A. Economic Aid
Direct economic aid has been utilized "to alleviate individual and
community losses resulting from a natural disaster.., as well as longer-
developing fish stock collapses, often resulting from a combination of
human action and environmental factors."' 58 Such a solution, however, is
151 Id.
152 Id. (quoting Andrew Rosenberg: "Many fishermen... have a relatively low education
level, and many have been doing it for quite a while, and most of the fishermen have very
high incomes. .... So what are they going to do instead that's going to give them that
kind of income with their skill levels?").
153 Id.
154 Id.; see also Harper & DeGregory, supra note 147.
155 See READ & BucK, supra note 142, at 2.
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 Id.
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only a short-term stop-gap, that many argue would not be necessary in a
healthier, inherently more resilient industry.159 As should be clear by such
aid's primary intent, overcapacity, as the fundamental problem
confronting fish stocks, is not addressed-the overcrowded fisheries are
merely subsidized by the federal government so they can stay in
business. 160 Critics of such efforts state that "rather than subsidizing and
promoting permanent dependency by a faltering industry, the federal
government should compassionately assist a reorganization of ailing
elements of the fishing industry that is led by people from fishing
communities and from within the fishing industry. ' ' 161 Economic aid is
not the answer.
B. Individual Fishing Quotas
The idea behind ITQs is to prevent the tragedy of the commons-
to stop overexploitation of a common resource by privatizing ownership of
the resource. 16 2 As advocates of this alternative argue, "economic theory
suggests that once fishermen have long-term property rights in the catch in
a fishery, they will have a greater interest in protecting the long-term
viability of the relevant fish populations."' 163 The theory is sound and it
certainly has the potential to address the issue of overcapacity by
explicitly recognizing, and thereby limiting, the specific rights of each
fisherman. 
164
Still, practical problems in implementation and enforcement, and
the likely social consequences involved in this system of property rights
represent significant challenges to the theory's real solvency. 165
Obviously, the fundamental question of how you divvy up the pie is at the
heart of every criticism. The industry, for the most part, remains
adamantly opposed to this solution because, as one commercial fisherman
has stated:
159 Id. at 20-21.
160 Id.
161 READ & BUCK, supra note 142, at 21.
162 See Dana, supra note 36, at 838.
163 Id.
164 See Cohn, supra note 5 ("The solution: Regulate the number of fish caught for
specific species by assigning a limited number of licenses to individual fishermen or
boats based on the number currently fishing and the allowable take.").
165 Dana, supra note 36, at 838.
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If IFQ/ITQs were allowed ... and .the allocations were
based on catch history, which they always are, it would
generate a tremendous windfall profit for the largest
operators who have caused the most damage. Why would
we choose to consider IFQ/ITQs now, when allocation
would reward those individuals whom had contributed
most to out fisheries crisis. This tremendous windfall profit
would then place today's fisherman, that is waiting. for the
fish to recover, in the untenable position of having to sell
their permit to these newly created millionaires. If this is
allowed to happen, our fishery will no longer include
thousands of independent operators, it will be one of tenant
farmers to a handful of large corporations. IFQ/ITQs, if
allowed, will do to New England fishing communities what
agribusiness did to the family farmers in the 1960s and
1970s.'
66
The argument in support then is one of pure economics, whereas
those opposed have continually emphasized that in pursuit of such
industrial efficiency, social justice, as well as a way of life, is sacrificed.
Given this Note's overarching emphasis on National Standard Eight and
fairness to the fishing communities impacted by any such regulation, IFQs
do not appear to be the appropriate solution either. Remarkably, Congress
has agreed with this assessment repeatedly and in 1996 voted a four-year
moratorium on the use of ITQs. 167  The moratorium was just recently
extended.
68
C. Capacity Reduction
As there is only one option left to support, this Note's advocacy of
a concerted government effort to reduce capacity in all overcrowded
fisheries via a buyback is somewhat anti-climatic. Still, there are
numerous criticisms of this government practice, and the position must be
defended.
166 Hearing on Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization, supra note 17 (testimony of Paul
Parker, Commercial Hook and Line Fisherman Executive Dir., Cape Cod Commercial
Hook Fishermen's Ass'n, Member of the Board, Marine Conservation Network).
167 See Cohn, supra note 5.
168 See West Coast Groundfish Hearing, supra note 144 (testimony of Jim Lone,
Chairman, Pacific Fishery Management Council).
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The concept of a buyout is simple enough: fishermen are paid 169 to
exit a given fishery through the purchase of their vessels or licenses. "The
common objective of vessel buybacks or license retirement is the
permanent withdrawal of effort (i.e. fishermen and their vessels) from a
particular fishery."' 170 The potential benefits are equally as obvious. As
Penny Dalton, the Administrator of NMFS, has stated:
A buyout reduces the amount of fishing pressure that
potentially can be brought to bear on a stock of fish in the
ocean and, therefore, reduces the risks of overfishing and
fishery failures. Secondly, a buyback in a fishery that is
already overfished reduces the harvest pressure in the short
term and allows fishermen who have invested their lives in
the fishery to leave with dignity and the ability to move on
to other work.'
71
There is no more immediate solution to the affects of overcapacity then to
actually reduce capacity directly.
Critical to the equation, however, is the actual reduction of
effort. 172 Keep in mind that capacity does not necessarily equal effort, as
removal of some fishermen from a given fishery may only prompt those
remaining to harvest more. 173 Key to the success of any buyback proposal
then is the continued regulation and restriction (albeit at a lesser level) of
those fishermen declining the offer to exit and staying in the fishery.
Additionally, the most significant criticism of buybacks regard
those capacity reduction efforts that occur in fisheries remaining open to
169 "In essence, there are three funding options that could come before Congress for
capacity reduction programs: 1) government funding (tax payer), 2) industry funding, or
3) joint government-industry funding." DANIEL A. WALDECK & EUGENE H. BUCK, THE
MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT:
REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES FOR THE 107TH CONGRESS, CRS REPORT RL30215, at 22
(2001). This note does not address the myriad number of arguments for and against each
of these funding options as buyback proposals in the past have overcome such
implementation questions.
170READ & BUCK, supra note 142, at 3.
171 Penny Dalton, Buyback Programs Work, USA TODAY, July 18, 2000, at 12A.
172 See READ & BUCK, supra note 142, at 21-22.
Id. ("Reduction in capacity may increase economic profitability for those remaining
within the fishery, by concentrating harvest among fewer vessels, but capacity reduction
does not assure recovery of a depleted stock because it does not necessarily reduce the
total harvest.").
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new entrants.' 74 In other words, if the fishermen can take the money and
then return to their fishery or some other overcrowded fishery, the benefit
is lost. 175  Opponents readily point to the New England groundfish
buyback program that occurred between 1995 and 1998 as an example of
how such capacity reduction measures can fail. 176 Almost $25 million was
utilized to remove seventy-nine vessels, accounting for nineteen percent of
the groundfish catch. 177 "However, 62 additional vessels have become
active since the buyback because no steps were taken during the program
to prevent previously inactive vessels from engaging in fishing.' 178 The
reentries have essentially negated the positive reductions in overcapacity
occurring with the initial purchase. 79 Utilizing this prior experience as a
learning tool, however, the mistake is easily averted in the future. Quite
simply, "[t]o have significant success, access to the fishery in question
must be limited or restricted [as] buybacks/retirements are not a realistic
option in fisheries that are open to new entrants. ' 1 80 It is in this vein that
the GAO recently recommended the following steps be taken to insure the
success of any capacity reduction program:
Design future buyback programs to (1) restrict buyback
participants from entering a fishery that has excess fishing
capacity; (2) restrict the use of unused fishing permits in a
buyback fishery with excess fishing capacity; (3) identify
mechanisms to minimize the incentives to increase fishing
capacity in a buyback fishery; and (4) develop performance
measures that relate to program goals and broader
legislative goals, such as the need to better manage fishing
capacity and conserve fish stocks.1
8
'
Such criticisms then are warranted, but are indeed correctable. By
carefully constructing a proposal that allows fishermen only to exit
permanently, an irreversible reduction in capacity can be achieved.
174 See id. at 21.
175See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RCED-00-120, COMMERCIAL FISHERIES:
ENTRY OF FISHERMEN LIMITS BENEFITS OF BUYBACK PROGRAMS (2000), at 4 [hereinafter
GAO, COMMERCIAL FISHERIES].
176 Id. at 8.
177Id. at4.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 READ & BUCK, supra note 142, at 21.
181 GAO, COMMERCIAL FISHERIES, supra note 175, at 17.
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Additionally, capacity reduction confers benefits on both those leaving
and those deciding to remain. 182 Paul Parker of the Cape Cod Commercial
Hook Fishermen's Association has stated, in addressing the New England
groundfish buyback:
"[The buyback] provided a dignified way to allow
fishermen who were ready to get out of the business to get
out of the business and also to take their fishing boats and
remove them from the fishery for the benefit of the future
of our fishery and for the future of future generations of
fishermen. It's a lot to ask for a man to turn his back on a
life of fishing and it's important to compensate them for all
the time and effort they put into building their business."'
183
Capacity reduction then at least allows the boat owners to bow out
gracefully.
Of course, no plan can effectively mitigate all of the economic
consequences of increased regulation, and by removing boats or licenses
from a given fishery's fleet capacity, others are necessarily affected.18
4
Hence, significant questions addressing "broader unemployment and other
economic implications of the community, e.g. marine businesses that may
suffer substantial income loss as the number of fishing vessels and
processing plants declines," must not be overlooked.18 5  "[E]ducational
and vocational programs for the newly unemployed or bought-out
maritime personnel" should necessarily be incorporated into any
scheme. 186 Nevertheless, the impact on said communities will not be
nearly as great as it would be if entire fisheries are permitted to sink or
swim on their own.
Finally, whenever there is a play for federal dollars, the political
viability of any such proposition should realistically help determine the
182 See READ & BUCK, supra note 142, at 4 ("The ultimate aim of most capacity
reduction schemes is to improve the economics of the fishery for those fishermen
choosing (and able) to remain as well as to provide some economic aid for those exiting
the fishery.").
183 David D. Haskell, Fisheries Hooked on Permit Problem, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Feb.
13, 2001.
184 See WALDECK & BUCK, supra note 169, at 21 ("[C]ompensating a boat owner does
not financially help the captain or crew, nor their family members, who have now lost a
source of income.").
185 Id.
186 Id
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worthiness of the solution. It would be great if Congress tomorrow voted
to provide every American $1 million each in an effort to eradicate
poverty, but political common sense dictates such a solution will never
occur, thus why consider it? Similarly, although not nearly as unlikely,
even a partially federally-funded buyout is sure to have opponents on
Capitol Hill.' 8 7 This hurdle, however, is clearly not insurmountable."'
Obviously, the singular message of a united constituency makes a
significant impact, 89thus "the impetus for any buyout needs to come from
within the subject constituency-if they are to succeed, buyouts need to be
designed and widely supported by the affected industry."'
9 0
In spite of everything, it should be emphasized that no proposal yet
evaluated better embodies the concepts of fairness and social justice that
must be protected according to National Standard Eight.' 9' As stated by
Glenn Roger Delaney, in testimony given before Congress:
Congress has ingrained this policy linkage in the
[Magnuson-Stevens Act] since its enactment and it was
clearly reaffirmed with the addition of National Standard
Eight and the provisions of 312(b) which provide authority
for the development of buyback programs to achieve very
specific conservation objectives in Council and State-
managed fisheries. As reflected in the Act's title, fisheries
conservation and management is by definition the
conservation of fish through the management of
fishermen-their families and communities. Socio-
187 See id.
188 Senator Gordon Smith (R-Or.) just recently testified, "[W]e clearly need to reduce
overcapacity in the groundfish fleet. While securing federal funds for vessel and permit
buyback problems is an uphill battle in the Congress, it is not an insurmountable
challenge-provided there is broad agreement in the industry over how to implement a
buyback program." West Coast Groundfish Hearing, supra note 144 (testimony of
Senator Gordon Smith).
189 See id.
190H.R. 3390, H.R. 3331 and H.R. 3516 and the Proposed Rule by NMFS on Time and
Area Closures in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico to Pelagic Longline Fishing Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans of the House Comm. on Res.,
106th Cong. (Feb. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Hearing on Proposed Rule by NMFS on Time
and Area Closures] (testimony of Glenn Roger Delaney, Consultant to Blue Water
Fishermen's Ass'n and U.S. Commissioner to ICCAT).
191 See id.
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economics is a fundamental reality of fishery
conservation. 19
2
In other words, implicit in the management of the resource is the
fundamental mandate that fishermen also be accounted for-the buyback
insures that they are.
V. CONCLUSION
This Nation's fisheries are in desperate need of help, but so too are
the commercial fishermen who have formed the backbone of coastal
communities for hundreds of years. Mistakes have been made for sure,
but at issue is a way of life forever linked with our history. Fishermen
deserve our assistance.
The courts, absent clear direction from the Congress, have not been
able to provide such protection, nor a path to follow. Arguably, the courts
have only contributed to the confusion. The tradeoff here between
conservation and economic survival is a common controversy with no
easy solution.
The only answer is to avoid the problem entirely by benefiting
both sides. Capacity reduction-a buyout-ensures the future survival of
a renewable, but currently scarce, natural resource, while also protecting
those individuals and communities that rely on the exploitation of that
resource.
Make no mistake, however-everyone is to blame. Consumer
demand for seafood fuels the practice and the federal government has
done everything but harvest the resource itself over the course of the past
twenty years. It is time to ante up.
As the 107th Congress meets to consider reauthorization of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act in the next two years, it is strongly urged that, in
line with the requirements of National Standard Eight, a capacity
reduction program inclusive of all overcrowded fisheries be considered.
192 Id.
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